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Section 1: Copy of Instructions for Authors 
 
Instructions to Authors for the APA journal “Emotion” 
Please consult APA's Instructions for All Authors for information regarding 
• Manuscript Preparation 
• Submitting Supplemental Materials 




• Publication Policies 
• Ethical Principles 
Submission 
Submit manuscripts electronically through the Manuscript Submission Portal in Word Document format 
(.doc). All tables and figures should be included in the manuscript file. 
David DeSteno  
Northeastern University  
Boston, MA 02115 
General correspondence may be directed to the Editor's Office. 
Masked Review Policy 
Masked reviews are optional, and authors who wish masked reviews must specifically request them when 
they submit their manuscripts. For masked reviews, the manuscript must include a separate title page with 
the authors' names and affiliations, and these ought not to appear anywhere else in the manuscript. 
Footnotes that identify the authors must be typed on a separate page. Authors are to make every effort to 
see that the manuscript itself contains no clues to their identities. 
Manuscript Submission Guidelines 
In addition to addresses and phone numbers, authors should supply email addresses and fax numbers for 
use by the editorial office and later by the production office. The majority of correspondence between the 
editorial office and authors is handled by email, so a valid email address is important to the timely flow of 
communication during the editorial process. 
Authors should provide email addresses in their cover letters and should keep a copy of the manuscript to 
guard against loss. Manuscripts are not returned. 
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Manuscripts for Emotion
®
 can vary in length; typically they will range from 10 to 40 double-spaced 
manuscript pages. Manuscripts should be of sufficient length to ensure theoretical and methodological 
competence. 
Most of the articles published in Emotion will be reports of original research, but other types of articles are 
acceptable. 
• Case studies from either a clinical setting or a laboratory will be considered if they raise or 
illustrate important questions that go beyond the single case and have heuristic value. 
• Articles that present or discuss theoretical formulations of emotion and related affective 
phenomena that evaluate competing theoretical perspectives, or that offer innovative commentary 
or analysis on timely topics of inquiry may also be accepted. 
• Comprehensive reviews of the empirical literature in an area of study are acceptable if they 
contain a meta-analysis and/or present novel theoretical or methodological perspectives. 
• Comments on articles published in the journal will be considered. 
Brief Reports 
Emotion also publishes brief reports. Manuscripts submitted as Brief Reports should not exceed 2,500 
words, exclusive of references and figure captions. There should be no more than 2 figures or tables and 
no more than 30 references. 
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Section 2: Literature Review 
 
The adaptive value for emotional wellbeing of emotional suppression and expressive 
flexibility: a review 
 
Introduction to the Topic Area 
  The regulation, intentional or otherwise, of emotional experience is a large focus 
of study in the clinical literature, as well more generally. In daily life, regulation 
processes such as suppression (e.g. maintaining a “poker face” during a card game) or 
reappraisal (e.g. approaching a potentially stressful job interview as a positive learning 
experience) have obvious utility. However, until recently, the predominant view in 
emotion research has been that suppression of emotions is linked to poor emotional 
outcomes. In this review, I will focus on the question of whether suppression of 
emotions is purely maladaptive, in the sense of being linked with adverse interpersonal 
and intrapersonal emotional outcomes, or whether there are also some benefits 
associated with it. I will attempt to review the empirical evidence on both sides of the 
adaptive/maladaptive debate, leading towards the conclusion that the adaptive value of 
suppression depends on the context in which it is applied. The review will then focus on 
the only empirical paradigm to directly test the notion that flexible regulation of 
emotional facial expressions (expressive flexibility) has adaptive value. 
 
Objectives 
The present literature review is organised around a number of questions pertinent 
to the empirical study of expressive flexibility and its relation to wellbeing, adjustment, 
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and emotional reactivity. First, we ask whether the available evidence supports the 
notion that expressive suppression is adaptive. Included in this topic is the issue of 
whether there are differences between the effects of spontaneous and instructed 
suppression. Second, we ask whether the available evidence supports the idea that 
flexibility in emotion regulation is adaptive. Third, we ask to what extent a particular 
measure of expressive flexibility (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; 
Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno, 2010) has been shown to be linked to well-being.  
 
Review of the Theoretical and Research Literature 
Search methods for the identification of studies  
 Standard methods were used to locate relevant research. Computer-based searches of 
ISI Web of Knowledge (Web of Science), PsycINFO, MEDLINE PubMed, and 
ScienceDirect were conducted, using the phrases “emotional flexibility,” “expressive 
flexibility”, “facial express* and flexibility”, “expressive suppression”, “emotion 
suppression”, and “emotion inhibition”. The Social Sciences Citation Index was 
searched for articles that cited key references. The reference lists of articles were also 
examined.  
 
Emotion suppression – is it adaptive? 
As there are costs associated with expression of negative emotions (e.g. Valiente 
et al., 2004), it is understandable that people would engage in attempts to suppress these 
emotional expressions. However, are there costs associated with the suppression of 
emotions? We now review the empirical evidence relating to this question. 
Costs of (self-reported) habitual suppression. Gross & John (2003) devised a 
self-report measure, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), to assess individual 
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differences in the habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies – suppression and 
reappraisal. Examples of the suppression items include “I control my emotions by not 
expressing them” and “I keep my emotions to myself”. Using this measure to identify 
habitual suppressors and reappraisers, Gross & John (2003) examined a range of 
individual differences associated with habitual use of these forms of regulation. Using 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
as well as simple self- and peer-ratings of emotional expressivity, peer-ratings of 
emotion regulation, and self-ratings of inauthenticity, the authors found an arresting 
pattern of results (Gross & John, 2003, experiment 3). Although suppression was 
successful in the sense that suppressors were rated by themselves and others as 
expressing no more emotion than non-suppressors, despite reporting feeling more 
negative emotion than non-suppressors, these suppression attempts were nonetheless 
detectable to others, who reported being able to tell when suppressors were inhibiting 
their emotional expressions. This pattern can clearly be interpreted as indicating 
substantial costs to habitual suppression, as people who habitually suppressed their 
emotions actually experienced greater negative affect than people who did not, and were 
not successful in concealing their suppression attempts. Furthermore, suppressors 
reported being aware of their own inauthenticity. However, inasmuch as suppressors 
expressed less emotion than they felt, and given that there are costs associated with 
expression of negative emotions (e.g. Valiente et al., 2004) it may be that the costs do 
not entirely outweigh the benefits of their efforts.  
Despite the possible social benefits of not expressing negative emotion, there is 
evidence for social costs of habitual suppression. Mauss et al., (2011) asked people to 
use a dial to continuously rate their emotional experience during amusing film clips. 
Their facial expressions were rated by trained observers, and the level of dissociation 
between reported emotion and displayed emotion was calculated. Higher levels of 
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experience-behaviour dissociation were found to be predictive of higher depressive 
symptoms and lower wellbeing at six-month follow-up. This effect was found to be 
mediated by social connectedness, supporting the idea that the habitual suppression of 
emotions has negative social consequences that affect individual wellbeing. Gross & 
John (2003, experiment 4) also found some social costs to habitual suppression. 
Suppressors reported being less likely to share positive as well as negative emotions 
with others, and reported more avoidance of attachment in close relationships – a lack of 
closeness that was also evident in peer ratings. Using social support indices from the 
COPE scale (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989), Gross & John found that habitual 
suppressors reported having less social support than non-suppressors, both in terms of 
instrumental (i.e. practical) support and emotional support. Interestingly, suppression 
was not found to be associated with likability – peers did not especially like or dislike 
suppressors. Gross & John’s findings were supported and extended in a recent study by 
Srivastava, Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross (2009), in which social functioning was 
measured over students’ first year in university. Srivastava et al. measured suppression 
as a stable trait and also measured dynamic changes in suppression from week to week, 
and found that both the stable and dynamic forms of suppression predicted lower social 
support, lower closeness to others, and lower social satisfaction, but were not related to 
likability.  
In the abovementioned studies, habitual suppression was consistently not related 
to likability, perhaps indicating a social benefit of suppression: although suppressors 
miss opportunities to form close relationships, they do not end up being disliked, 
something that (in reality, or perhaps only in their perception) might happen were they to 
express more negative emotion. However, the evidence on a relationship between 
habitual suppression and likability is mixed, as other studies have found suppressors to 
be less liked than expressors. Sabatelli and Rubin (1986) asked participants to rate the 
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interpersonal attractiveness of people they had viewed spontaneously reacting to 
emotion-inducing slides. They found a positive relationship between emotional 
expressivity and likability, independently of the relationship between physical 
attractiveness and likability. Riggio and Friedman (1986) reported a similar effect, 
although gender moderated the relationship between likability and expressivity to some 
degree: facially expressive women were rated as more likable than facially inexpressive 
women, whereas for men other factors such as bodily expressivity were more strongly 
related to likability.  
Thus, habitual suppression has been found to have costs in terms of negative 
emotion experienced, detectability, and social functioning. The finding of greater 
negative affect in suppressors was given further weight by the finding that suppressors 
reported greater symptoms of depression on three different rating scales (Gross & John, 
2003, experiment 5). This finding also begs a “chicken and egg” question about the extra 
negative emotion experienced: do suppressors experience this negative emotion as a 
result of their engagement in suppression, or do they engage in suppression as a reaction 
to higher levels of negative emotion? In order to address this question, it is useful to 
examine the immediate effects of experimentally-induced or instructed suppression.  
Spontaneous vs. instructed suppression. In examining suppression, one can 
ask participants to report on their habitual practices, instruct them to suppress in a 
particular situation, or expose them to a particular situation and assess (by observation or 
self-report) whether or not they spontaneously suppressed. The latter approach was 
taken by Egloff, Schmukle, Burns & Schwerdtfeger (2006) gave people a simulated 
public-speaking task designed to induce stress, and asked them afterwards whether they 
suppressed their emotions, using a modified version of the ERQ. Egloff et al. found that 
compared to spontaneous reappraisal, spontaneous suppression was associated with less 
expressed anxiety, but no less negative affect. Also, suppression was associated with 
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greater physiological responding to the task, using skin conductance and heart rate 
measures, suggesting that participants actually found the task more stressful. 
A direct comparison of spontaneous and instructed suppression, as well as an 
assessment of habitual suppression, was conducted by Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, 
Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross (2010). Recovered-depressed participants reported more 
spontaneous suppression in response to a sadness-inducing film than never-depressed 
participants, although there were no differences between the groups in terms of the 
amount of habitual suppression reported (using the ERQ and the nonacceptance subscale 
of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). For 
both groups, instructed suppression during another sadness-inducing film resulted in 
more negative mood than reappraisal. 
In sum, the evidence reviewed points towards spontaneous suppression having 
similar effects in the immediate as habitual suppression is reported to over the longer 
term: reduction of expressed emotion, but either no change or an increase in negative 
emotion experienced. Instructed suppression also appears to be an ineffective strategy 
for reduction of the experience of negative emotion, although there is no evidence for a 
link between vulnerability to depression and the way people engage in instructed 
suppression. We will now review the findings from studies looking exclusively at 
instructed suppression. 
Costs of instructed suppression. Gross & Levenson (1997) asked people to 
suppress (or not suppress) their emotional reactions while watching positive (amusing) 
and negative (sad) films. Their behaviour was then rated for expressivity by people blind 
to the instructions given. Instructed suppression was successful in that expressions of 
emotion were dramatically reduced compared to the no-instruction condition. However, 
physiological responses to suppression showed significant differences in all indices 
measured (somatic activity, skin conductance, heart rate, breathing rate), indicating 
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greater sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system. Physiological costs were 
also reported by Quartana & Burns (2010), who gave participants a mental arithmetic 
task (serial subtraction, aloud, by 7s beginning from 8,258 as quickly and accurately as 
possible) with experimenter feedback designed to induce either anxiety or anger, under 
instructions to suppress expression, experience, or to not suppress. Irrespective of the 
anger/anxiety condition, participants in both suppression conditions demonstrated higher 
cardiovascular stress responses (systolic blood pressure) than those in the control 
condition. 
Cognitive and social consequences of instructed suppression have been reported 
by Richards, Butler & Gross (2003), who asked couples to discuss a relationship 
conflict, with one partner under suppression, reappraisal or control instruction 
conditions. The instructed partner in the suppression condition showed poorer memory 
for details of the conversation than the other partner, or people in the other conditions. 
Furthermore, the instructed partner in the suppression condition showed improved 
memory for emotional behaviour and reactions by their partner during the conversation. 
Further social consequences of instructed suppression were found by Butler et al., 
(2003), who asked pairs of participants to discuss an upsetting topic (relating to an 
emotion-inducing film they had been shown), with one of the participants having been 
given suppression, reappraisal, or control instructions. Suppression instructions led to 
reduced expressivity and responsiveness, as well as heightened negative and reduced 
positive emotion, in the suppressor, and produced heightened cardiovascular responding 
in their partners as well as themselves. The suppression instructions also had a negative 
effect on the quality of the interaction, distracting the suppressor from the conversation 
and leading to suppressors’ partners reporting less rapport and affiliation than partners in 
the other groups. Suppressors’ partners also reported being less likely to want to form a 
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friendship with the suppressors than people in the other conditions did regarding their 
partners. 
Benefits of emotional suppression. The literature reviewed in the above 
sections suggests that a variety of costs are associated with emotional suppression, be it 
habitual, spontaneous, or instructed. However, we now turn our attention to evidence 
suggesting that there may be benefits associated with emotional suppression. 
Dunn, Billotti, Murphy & Dalgleish (2009) asked participants to view a 
distressing video of the aftermath of road accidents under suppression, acceptance, or 
control conditions. They found that compared to the control condition, people in the 
suppression group reported a reduced experience of fear during the film, although their 
skin conductance and heart-rate responses increased. Importantly, at a later time-point, 
people in the suppression condition had reduced free recall of the content of the video, 
and reduced likelihood of intrusive images from the video. Dunn et al. interpret this 
result as evidence for the utility of suppression in circumstances such as exposure to 
traumatic events. Liverant, Brown, Barlow & Roemer (2008) showed sadness-inducing 
films to three groups of depressed participants, under suppression, acceptance, or no 
instructions. They assessed spontaneous suppression in the no-instruction group using 
the ERQ. Results showed that both spontaneous and instructed suppression led to a 
reduction in self-reported experience of sadness during the films. 
These two studies provide some indication of possible benefits of instructed and 
spontaneous suppression. It should be noted, however, that Dunn et al. (2009)’s 
suppression instructions included an instruction to “adopt a detached and unemotional 
attitude” during the film. This part of the instruction more closely resembles the re-
appraisal instructions in previous studies (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1997). Thus, this 
difference casts some doubt on the actual process (suppression of response vs. 
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disengagement from the stimulus) engaged in by participants in the suppression 
condition in this study.  
There are suggestions that reduced expression of emotion may be useful in the 
context of bereavement. Bonanno & Keltner (1997 – see also Keltner & Bonanno, 1997) 
coded facial expressions of bereaved people 6 months after their loss, as they described 
their relationship with their deceased spouse. They found that negative emotions 
expressed at 6 months post-loss predicted increased negative emotion and grief at 14 
months, and poorer perceived health at 25 months. This relationship between facial 
expression and later wellbeing persisted when initial levels of self-reported emotion, 
grief, and health were controlled for. However, this should not be taken as evidence that 
emotional expression is uniformly beneficial in bereavement, as the opposite pattern 
(better health, less grief) was predicted by positive facial expressions at 6 months. Thus, 
this is evidence for highly context-dependent benefits of suppression: suggesting it is 
helpful with regard to negative emotion, in the context of bereavement.  
Much research has focused on repressive coping, which is defined as a disparity 
between emotion that is reported and emotion that is evident in 
behavioural/physiological responses (e.g. Derakshan, Eysenck & Myers, 2007). A recent 
study found that when discussing negative life events, individuals who exhibited 
repressive coping had fewer symptoms of psychopathology, experienced fewer health 
problems and somatic complaints, and were rated as better adjusted by close friends than 
those who did not exhibit repressive coping (Coifman, Bonanno, Ray & Gross, 2007). 
Similarly, Smeets, Giesbrecht, Raymaekers, Shaw & Merckelbach (2010) found that 
repressive coping was related to fewer post-traumatic stress symptoms in people who 
had experienced negative life events. It is arguable that repressive coping should not be 
considered equivalent to expressive or emotional suppression, in that the former entails 
reduced self-report of emotion, while the latter entails high self-reported emotion, but 
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reduced expression of emotion. Nonetheless, these studies from the repressive coping 
literature do provide converging evidence that suppression of emotion, at some level, 
can have benefits in certain contexts. 
How important are context and flexibility? The evidence reviewed above 
suggests that emotional suppression has emotional and social costs in some 
circumstances, but can have emotional and social benefits in other circumstances. 
Examples of direct contradiction in the literature are few, and those that exist seem to be 
explicable by subtleties in methodology, such as the similarity between the 
“suppression” instructions used by Dunn et al. (2009) and the “reappraisal” instructions 
used by other studies (e.g. Butler et al., 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). Rather, the 
weight of evidence seems to point toward the importance of the context in which a 
regulation strategy takes place. 
As an example of this, Butler, Lee & Gross (2007) demonstrated that the social 
consequences of emotion suppression seem to be culture-specific. Using a similar 
procedure to Butler et al. (2003), they found that the negative effects of instructed 
suppression were reduced in participants with Asian-American values, compared to 
those with European-American values, in line with evidence that habitual suppression is 
more normative in Asian-American culture (Gross & John, 2003).  
Given that we all regularly move between different contexts in our daily lives, a 
corollary of the importance of context is the importance of flexibility in regulation 
strategies. At a developmental level, evidence for this notion comes from the finding that 
children whose level of expressivity is at either extreme – either very expressive or very 
inhibited – are more likely to manifest with externalising behavioural problems (Cole, 
Zahn-Waxler, Fox, Usher, & Welsh, 1996). Looking instead at parenting, there is 
evidence that the success of parenting interventions for externalising behaviour is related 
to the degree to which the parent is able to move flexibly from one emotional state to 
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another, according to contextual demands (Granic, O’Hara, Pepler, & Lewis, 2007). At 
the level of brain activity, there is evidence that resilience is related to the flexibility of 
activity in certain brain structures across contexts. In an event-related fMRI design, 
Waugh, Wager, Fredrickson, Noll, & Taylor (2008) showed threat and non-threat 
pictures to individuals with high and low self-reported resiliency, and found that while 
the high-resilience individuals showed prolonged anterior insula activation (associated 
with anticipatory anxiety, Ploghaus, Becerra, Borras, & Borsook, 2003) only for the 
threat pictures, while the low-resilience individuals showed this prolonged activation for 
all stimuli.  
This idea of flexibility of emotional responding – of the ability to not get “stuck” 
in a particular emotional state – has also been found to be linked to the development of 
depression, and to resilience and recovery from adverse states such as depression and 
bereavement. Allen, Trinder, and Brennen (1999) measured startle response to positive 
and negative pictures, and found that while non-depressed participants had stronger 
startle blinks for unpleasant than pleasant pictures, depressed participants had 
unmodulated startle responses for all picture types (see Dichter, Tomarken, Shelton, & 
Sutton, 2004, for a similar finding). Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib (2002) 
measured physiological responding to positive and negative emotional films, and found 
that not only did depressed participants show a context insensitivity in their 
physiological responding to the films, the degree of reactivity to positive (amusing) 
films was inversely predictive of their degree of recovery from depression at six-month 
follow-up. In a similar vein, Coifman and Bonanno (2010) interviewed people four 
months after experiencing a bereavement, and asked them to describe loss-related and 
non-loss-related events, while their facial affective responses were rated by the 
experimenters. The degree to which participants were able to show context-sensitive 
emotions – that is, positive affect while talking about non-loss topics, and negative 
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affect while talking about loss topics – was inversely predictive of depression symptoms 
at 18 months post-bereavement. Together, these findings suggest that flexibility and 
context-specificity of emotional responding are important resilience factors for recovery 
from adverse states. 
Is there direct evidence for the importance of expressive flexibility? In an 
attempt to address more directly the notion that flexible regulation of facial expressions 
might be important for emotional wellbeing, Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & 
Coifman (2004) devised a task in which people are asked in some situations to enhance, 
and in others to suppress, expression of emotions they experience. In contrast to other 
laboratory emotion regulation procedures (e.g. Gross & John, 2003), in this expressive 
flexibility (EF) task, the key measure is the balanced ability to suppress and enhance. 
Participants view emotionally evocative pictures from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1995), under instruction to suppress or 
enhance their emotional expression. Video recordings of their facial reactions are then 
blind-rated according to the degree of emotion expressed, producing scores for 
successful suppression and successful enhancement. Bonanno et al. (2004) found that 
while a high score on one but not the other measure (e.g. enhancement but not 
suppression, or vice versa) did not predict adjustment over a one-year period, a high 
summed score (i.e. enhancement plus suppression) did. A refinement of this procedure 
was conducted by Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno (2010), who subtracted the polarity 
score (the absolute value of the difference between the enhancement and suppression 
scores) from the sum flexibility score (the sum of the enhancement and suppression 
scores) to produce a balanced EF score. They found this measure of EF to be stable over 
a 3-year period, and to be again associated with adjustment over a one-year period, this 
time using friend-rated adjustment rather than self-report. Interestingly, the association 
between adjustment and EF was most pronounced with participants who had greater 
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levels of cumulative life stress in that one-year period. Furthermore, when EF was 
measured under a subliminal threat prime condition, participants with low levels of 
cumulative life stress were actually rated as better adjusted if they had low EF – 
indicating perhaps that although EF has adaptive value in situations requiring resilience, 
it may have social costs in other situations. 
It is perhaps worth considering whether the research into emotional regulation 
remains somewhat too detached from research into clinical theory and practice. John & 
Gross (2004) acknowledged that most of the emotional regulation research at that time 
had been conducted with non-clinical samples, and stated a need to go beyond this. In a 
further attempt to encourage cross-fertilization between the clinical and emotion 
regulation literatures, Rottenberg and Gross (2007) attempted to provide a “map” of 
emotion regulation research for use by psychotherapy researchers, drawing on Sloan and 
Kring’s (2007) review on measuring changes in emotion during psychotherapy. This 
work is beginning to emerge with some force now, as illustrated in reviews by Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Schweizer (2010) and Kring & Sloan (2010), and clinical theory is 
starting to emerge that has relevance both trans-diagnostically and across different 
emotion regulation strategies (e.g. Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004; Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).  
 
Conclusion 
Research into emotion suppression has provided many examples of the potential 
maladaptiveness of this regulation strategy. However, as this review demonstrates, 
evidence has accumulated on both sides of the adaptive/maladaptive debate, suggesting 
that context, and flexible adaptation to context, may be as important as choice of 
regulation strategy. Evidence has begun to accumulate that more directly supports the 
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notion that flexibility in expressive regulation is important. However, this line of 
research is still in its infancy. Given the importance of emotion regulation in many 
models of psychopathology (e.g. Berenbaum, Raghavan, Le, Vernon, & Gomez, 2003; 
Werner & Gross, 2010) and treatment approaches (e.g. Linehan, 1993), it would 
undoubtedly be beneficial to clinical psychology theory and practice if more research 
were to be conducted on the specific issue of the adaptiveness of flexible regulation of 
emotional expressions.  
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Section 3: Manuscript 
Abstract 
Habitual suppression of emotions has been linked to adverse consequences such 
as avoidant attachment, lower social support, and reduced relationship closeness (e.g. 
John & Gross, 2004). However, accumulating evidence that expression and suppression 
can be both adaptive and maladaptive in different contexts suggests the importance of 
flexibility in emotional regulation. The present study examined the mechanisms 
underlying the only laboratory measure of emotional flexibility: the Expressive 
Flexibility (EF) task (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004). This 
measure has been linked to adjustment over a one-year period, especially in the context 
of social threat, and among people who have experienced higher levels of life stress 
(Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno, 2010). We sought to test whether EF is related to 
physiological recovery from stress in the immediate term. Participants completed 
questionnaire measures, the EF Task and a stressful public speaking task. In the EF task, 
participants were filmed suppressing, exaggerating, and not altering facial reactions to 
negative and positive pictures. A “balanced EF” score was calculated reflecting their 
ability to suppress and exaggerate with equal success. Regression analyses used EF 
scores as predictors for psychophysiological indices of stress (SCR and HR) during and 
after the public-speaking task. The interaction of EF and social safeness (SSPS) was 
predictive of the magnitude of SCR recovery, such that for people with lower EF, higher 
SSPS is predictive of greater SCR recovery. These results converge with previous 
findings on the suggestion that EF is related to resilience, especially in the context of 
adversity.  
 
Keywords: Expressive flexibility, social safeness; emotion regulation; expression, 
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suppression, stress, resilience. 
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Is Expressive Flexibility Related To Recovery From A Stressful Task? 
 
The issue of whether it is better to express emotions or to ‘hold them in’ has been 
prominent in psychology and psychotherapy for some time. The study of emotion 
regulation has yielded substantial evidence that there are social and emotional costs to 
expressive suppression (e.g. Gross, 2002; Butler et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003). 
However, evidence has also begun accumulating suggesting that in some circumstances 
there can be benefits to suppression (e.g. Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Levenson & 
Gottman, 1983), and also costs to expression (e.g. Bonanno et al., 2007), prompting 
some theorists to emphasise the importance of context-appropriate emotion regulation 
(e.g. Feldman Barrett & Gross, 2001; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The attainment of 
context-appropriate emotion regulation clearly demands a level of flexibility in the 
application of different emotion regulation strategies: the ability to suppress emotional 
expression in some situations, and enhance it in others. This very ability, termed 
expressive flexibility (EF), has been directly examined in three studies, which have 
demonstrated that EF is predictive of adjustment to adversity (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, 
Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Gupta & Bonanno, 2011), and that this relationship is 
moderated by the level of background adversity, and by social threat (Westphal, Seivert, 
& Bonanno, 2010). The current investigation was designed to examine possible 
mechanisms underlying this relationship. Specifically, we sought to test whether EF 
would be predictive of immediate-term regulation of physiological stress arousal, and 
whether this relationship too would be moderated by background adversity and social 
threat.  
 
The Negative Consequences of Suppression 
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The habitual suppression of emotions has been linked with a variety of adverse 
consequences, such as avoidant attachment, reduced sharing of emotions, lower social 
support, lower peer-rated likeability, and reduced relationship closeness (Gross, 2002; 
Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). There is evidence that both stable (i.e. trait-
level) and dynamic (measured from week to week) measures of suppression predict 
lower social support, lower closeness to others, and lower social satisfaction (Srivastava, 
Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009). People who habitually attempt to suppress the 
emotions they experience have been found to actually experience more negative affect, 
and less positive affect, than other people (Gross & John, 2003), and people who 
reported suppressing emotion during a public-speaking task have been found to have a 
greater psychophysiological stress response to that task than those who did not (Egloff, 
Schmukle, Burns & Schwerdtfeger, 2006). Furthermore, conversational partners have 
reported being able to detect habitual suppressors’ attempts at suppression, and indeed 
suppressors have reported being aware of their own inauthenticity (Gross & John, 2003).  
Experimental studies investigating the effects of instructed expressive 
suppression have found immediate negative consequences. Conversations conducted 
with one partner under instruction to suppress any expression of emotion have been 
found to lead to poor interpersonal coordination, decreased feelings of rapport and 
affiliation, increased negative feelings about the interaction, and increased blood 
pressure in both conversational partners (Butler et al., 2003), as well as decreased 
memory for  conversational details, but increased memory for emotional reactions 
(Richards, Butler & Gross, 2003). Instructed suppression has also been found to lead to 
increased negative mood (Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010), 
and greater cardiovascular stress responses (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Quartana & 
Burns, 2010) to experimental stimuli. 
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The Importance of Context 
However, although there is support for the general idea that emotional 
suppression has negative consequences compared to emotional expressivity, evidence 
has also come to light suggesting that emotional suppression may, in the right context, 
serve an adaptive purpose. Reduced expression of negative emotions in adverse contexts 
has been found to predict better maintenance of social networks, (Coyne, 1976; Gottlieb, 
1991), and facilitate close relationships (Levenson & Gottman, 1983). Similar evidence 
comes from the study of repressive coping behaviour, often measured by a discrepancy 
between reported affective experience and behavioural or sympathetic nervous system 
response (e.g. Derakshan, Eysenck & Myers, 2007). A recent study found that when 
discussing negative life events, individuals who exhibited repressive coping had fewer 
symptoms of psychopathology, experienced fewer health problems and somatic 
complaints, and were rated as better adjusted by close friends than those who did not 
exhibit repressive coping (Coifman, Bonanno, Ray & Gross, 2007). Similarly, Smeets, 
Giesbrecht, Raymaekers, Shaw & Merckelbach (2010) found that repressive coping was 
related to fewer post-traumatic stress symptoms in people who had experienced negative 
life events. The importance of context is further emphasised by findings suggesting that 
expression of emotion can be unhelpful if not done in a context-sensitive manner. For 
example, a study of survivors of childhood sexual abuse (Bonanno et al., 2007) showed 
that even expressions of positive emotion can, in certain contexts, be maladaptive. 
Moreover, Butler, Lee & Gross (2007) demonstrated that the social consequences of 
emotion suppression seem to be culture-specific: the negative effects of instructed 
suppression were reduced in participants with Asian-American values, compared to 
those with European-American values, in line with evidence that habitual suppression is 
more normative in Asian-American culture (Gross & John, 2003).  
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The Importance of Flexibility 
Given that we all regularly move between different contexts in our daily lives, a 
corollary of the importance of context is the importance of flexibility in regulation 
strategies. The accumulating evidence that both emotional expression and suppression 
can be both adaptive and maladaptive in different contexts has been taken by some 
researchers as an indication of the importance of achieving flexibility in regulation of 
emotional expression and experience: to be able to move flexibly between coping 
strategies depending on the context of a situation (Cole, Martin & Dennis, 2004; 
Compas, Malcarne, & Fondacaro, 1988; Feldman Barrett & Gross, 2001; Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004). However, despite this growing theoretical focus on the importance of 
flexibility in emotion regulation, relatively few direct empirical tests of this idea have 
been carried out. At a developmental level, some evidence for this notion comes from 
the finding that children whose level of expressivity is at either extreme – either very 
expressive or very inhibited – are more likely to manifest with externalising behavioural 
problems as assessed by parents and teachers (Cole, Zahn-Waxler, Fox, Usher, & Welsh, 
1996). There is also some evidence that the success of parenting interventions for 
externalising behaviour is related to the degree to which the parent is able to move 
flexibly from one emotional state to another, according to contextual demands (Granic, 
O’Hara, Pepler, & Lewis, 2007). Furthermore, at the physiological level, there is some 
evidence that resilience is related to the flexibility of threat-related responses across 
contexts, in that for both event-related fMRI (Waugh, Wager, Fredrickson, Noll, & 
Taylor, 2008) and startle reflex measures (Waugh, Thompson & Gotlib, 2011), more 
resilient people showed threat-related responses specifically to threat stimuli, while less 
resilient people showed threat responses also to non-threat stimuli. Overall, however, the 
direct study of flexibility in emotional regulation is in its infancy.  
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Expressive Flexibility 
In an attempt to address directly the notion that flexible regulation of emotion 
might be important for emotional wellbeing, Bonanno et al. (2004) devised a task in 
which people are asked in some situations to enhance, and in others to suppress, 
expression of emotions they experience. In contrast to other laboratory emotion 
regulation procedures (e.g. Gross & John, 2003), in this expressive flexibility (EF) task, 
the key measure is the balanced ability to suppress and enhance. Participants view 
emotionally evocative pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1995), under instruction to suppress or enhance their 
emotional expression. Video recordings of their facial reactions are then blind-rated 
according to the degree of emotion expressed, producing scores for successful 
suppression and successful enhancement. Bonanno et al. (2004) found that while a high 
score on one but not the other measure (e.g. enhancement but not suppression, or vice 
versa) did not predict adjustment over a one-year period, a high summed score (i.e. 
enhancement plus suppression) did. A refinement of this procedure was conducted by 
Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno (2010), who subtracted the polarity score (the absolute 
value of the difference between the enhancement and suppression scores) from the sum 
flexibility score (the sum of the enhancement and suppression scores) to produce a 
balanced EF score. They found EF to be stable over a 3-year period, with levels of 
correlation between administrations similar to those found for trait measures of 
personality. Importantly, in examining associations with adjustment over a one-year 
period, this time using friend-rated adjustment rather than self-report, they found that the 
relationship between EF and adjustment was moderated by the level of cumulative life 
stress over the year: participants with higher EF were rated as more highly adjusted by 
friends than were participants with lower EF, but only if those participants had 
experienced frequent life stressors. Furthermore, this relationship between EF and 
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cumulative life stress was even more pronounced when EF was measured in the context 
of social threat (manipulated using a subliminal threat prime), consistent with the idea 
that meaningful resilience is best measured under stressful conditions (Friborg, Hjemdal, 
Rosenvinge, & Martinussen, 2006). A further study (Gupta & Bonanno, 2011) 
demonstrated that people suffering from complicated grief had deficits in balanced EF, 
relative to aymptomatic bereaved people, and a non-bereaved control group.  
 
The Current Investigation 
Balanced EF, as measured using the EF paradigm (Bonanno et al., 2004; 
Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno, 2010) has been linked to adjustment over a one-year 
period, especially among people who have experienced higher levels of life stress, and 
when measured in the context of social threat. However, although there is a wealth of 
research on emotion regulation more generally (Gross, 2007), research on this particular 
measure – to date the only behavioural laboratory measure of emotional flexibility – is 
still in its infancy. While the three published studies (Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et 
al., 2010; Gupta & Bonanno, 2011) indicate a relationship between EF and adjustment 
or resiliency, as yet we have no empirical indication as to the mechanisms underlying 
this relationship. For example, the relationship between expressive flexibility and short-
term reactions to stressful situations is not known. Given the psychophysiological 
evidence of more effective recovery from aversive experiences (quicker return to normal 
startle responses following a negative image) in more resilient individuals (Waugh et al., 
2011), it seems possible that better long-term coping in high-EF individuals is due in 
part to more effective immediate-term regulation of physiological arousal responses to 
aversive experiences. Indeed, there is evidence that trait-resilient people tend to 
demonstrate more rapid cardiovascular recovery from a stressful speech task (Tugade & 
Fredrickson, 2004). The current investigation was designed to advance research into EF 
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by examining this issue, and specifically, by testing the hypothesis that people with 
higher EF would show more effective physiological recovery from a stressful speech 
task. Also, given Westphal et al. (2010)’s finding that the relation between EF and 
adjustment is moderated by social threat (threat prime) and background adversity (life 
stress), we sought to test the hypothesis that any relationship between EF and 
physiological recovery following a stressful task would also be moderated by social 
threat and background adversity. As a secondary aim, we sought to test whether these 
variables (EF, social threat and background adversity) were related to initial 
physiological reactivity to the stressful task. Given that EF is an index of expression 
regulation, we did not have reason to expect it to be related to the magnitude of initial 
reactivity – rather, we confined our hypotheses to the recovery after the initial reaction. 
Another secondary aim was to test whether the self-reported affective response to the 
stressful task would show any relationship with EF, social threat and background 
adversity. 
To test these hypotheses, we employed the EF paradigm, followed by a stressful 
simulated public speaking task, while measuring skin conductance response (SCR) and 
heart rate (HR) as psychophysiological indices of arousal. The combination of a stressful 
public-speaking task and SCR/HR as indices of arousal has been successfully used to 
investigate physiological responding in spontaneous emotional suppression (Egloff et 
al., 2006). As an inverse measure of social threat, we administered the Social Safeness 
and Pleasure Scale (Gilbert et al., 2009), which measures the construct of social 
safeness: the extent to which individuals feel a sense of warmth, acceptance, and 
connectedness in their social world. Social safeness is thought to reflect the output of a 
neural soothing-affiliation system (Gilbert, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2008; see also Depue & 
Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005). Higher levels of social safeness are likely to indicate lower 
levels of social threat, in that the proposed neural soothing-affiliation system underlying 
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feelings of social safeness is thought to have an inhibitory relationship with the neural 
threat system (Gilbert, 2005). As a measure of background adversity, we administered 
the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), a widely-used index of 
current symptoms of depression. This measure of adversity was chosen for pragmatic 
reasons, in place of Westphal et al. (2010)’s year-long weekly monitoring of adverse life 
events. However, it may also capture a more general picture of background adversity. 
Recent evidence (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012) shows that for people whose 
repertoire includes maladaptive emotion-regulation strategies, adaptive strategies are 
particularly predictive of psychopathology outcomes. Thus, the flexible use of a range of 
emotion-regulation strategies has been shown to be particularly important in the context 
of background external (life stress – Westphal et al., 2010) or internal (maladaptive 
strategies – Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012) adversity. A measure of current 
depression symptoms is likely to capture the effects of adversity from either external or 
internal sources. 
  35 
Method 
Participants 
In order to determine the required number of participants for the regression 
analysis with physiological recovery as the outcome variable and EF and social safeness 
as predictors, a power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, 
& Lang, 2009). An effect size (f
2
) of .32 was calculated from a similar study using a 
similar regression with EF as a predictor (Westphal, Seivert & Bonanno, 2010). To 
reduce the risk of a Type II error statistical significance was set at .05 and power at 80%. 
For both hypotheses one and two: N = 39, effect size (f
2
) = .32, alpha = .05, actual 
power = .8099. 
41 undergraduates from the University of Exeter participated in return for 
payment or course credit. Recruitment was conducted via a database of individuals who 
had consented to be contacted about research participation. Two participants’ data were 
excluded from analyses: one due to that participant having misunderstood the 
instructions in the Expressive Flexibility task (this was evident from the video feed 
during testing), and the other due to the heart-rate monitor failing during data collection. 
Of the remaining 39 participants, 13 were male and 26 female, and the mean age was 
20.7, with ages ranging between 18 and 27. 
 
Measures  
Beck Depression Inventory II. We used the Beck Depression Inventory II 
(BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to assess current symptoms of depression. The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report instrument used to assess cognitive, affective, behavioural 
and physiological symptoms of depression, with the total score representing a 
combination of the number of symptom categories endorsed and the severity of those 
symptoms. The BDI is widely used in clinical and research settings, and has robust 
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psychometric properties (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). 
Social Safeness and Pleasure Scale. The Social Safeness and Pleasure Scale 
(SSPS; Gilbert et al., 2009) is an 11-item self-report instrument used to measure social 
safeness: “the extent to which individuals feel a sense of warmth, acceptance, and 
connectedness in their social world” (Kelly et al., 2012). Participants use a Likert scale 
from 1 (‘‘almost never’’) to 5 (‘‘almost all the time’’) to indicate their agreement with 
11 statements such as ‘‘I feel a sense of belonging,’’ ‘‘I feel secure and wanted,’’ and ‘‘I 
feel accepted by people.’’ This scale has been found to have adequate internal 
consistency. 
Profile of Mood States. The Profile of Mood States - Short Form (POMS-SF; 
Curran, Andrykowski, & Studts, 1995) is a 21-item self-report instrument used to 
measure current mood state. Participants are given a list of adjectives, and indicate the 
degree to which each one represents their current mood state using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The six positive adjectives in the list are 
reverse-scored, so that overall, a higher score represents a more negative current mood 
state. 
 Expressive Flexibility task. This task followed the procedure used by Westphal 
et al. (2010). Participants were seated before a desktop computer with a webcam 
positioned above their line of vision. They were presented with blocked sequences of 
five picture stimuli selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995). Stimuli were balanced for valence and arousal across 
blocks using the IAPS norms (Lang et al., 1995). Within each block, each stimulus was 
presented for 10 s, with 4 s between stimuli. For practice, participants viewed randomly-
presented blocks of positive or negative stimuli, and following each block rated the 
degree to which they felt "negative emotion” (e.g., anger, revulsion, sadness, distress), 
by typing a number between 1 (no negative emotion) and 7 (extreme negative emotion), 
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and then the degree to which they felt "positive emotion” (e.g., happiness, joy, 
amusement, interest), using a similar scale.  
 Following the practice trials, participants were told that there was another 
participant in the adjacent room who was also taking part in the experiment (another 
participant was not actually present). They were told that they would not see the other 
person, but the other person was able to view them on a video monitor. They were also 
told that they would always be informed when the monitor is on and when it is off, and 
that the other person would not hear them or see the picture stimuli, but would have to 
guess their emotions for each block of stimuli. Participants were told that when the 
experiment began, the computer would (a) sometimes ask them to enhance their 
expression of emotion so the observer could more easily guess what they were feeling, 
(b) sometimes ask them to suppress their expression of emotion so the observer could 
not easily guess what they were feeling, and (c) sometimes inform them that the monitor 
was turned off and that the observer would be unable to see them, in which case they 
should behave as they would normally. Six blocks of experimental trials (enhancement, 
suppression, or neutral instruction using positive or negative stimuli) were then 
presented in a random order whilst the participant was video-recorded modulating their 
facial expression. The presentation order of the blocks was counterbalanced across each 
participant (six blocks of enhancement, suppression, or neutral instruction using positive 
or negative stimuli). The video of the participant from each block was automatically 
rated for emotion expressed using the computer package “eMotion” (Gevers, 2008). 
Suppression and enhancement scores were calculated by subtracting the mean level of 
expressed emotion in the neutral condition from that in the suppression condition, or the 
enhancement condition, respectively. EF scores were calculated using the same three-
step procedure as Westphal et al., (2010). First, we calculated sum EF by adding the 
enhancement and suppression scores; Second, we calculated expressive polarity by 
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taking the absolute value of the difference between the enhancement and suppression 
scores; Third, we calculated balanced expressive flexibility by subtracting the polarity 
score from the sum flexibility score. It is to this balanced EF score that we refer when 
using the term “EF score” in our results and discussion. 
 Speech task. The Speech task (Hughes & Stoney, 2000) is designed to induce a 
tolerable degree of stress in the participant. It involves the participant preparing and 
presenting a speech to camera, on a topic provided to them – in our case the topic was 
“arguments for and against euthanasia”. Participants were told that their speech should 
last three minutes and would be videotaped. They were given three minutes to prepare 
their speech, and were told that they would not be able to see their notes during the 
speech. After the preparation period the participants presented their speech directly to a 
video-camera. If participants stopped talking before the three-minute period elapsed, 
they were asked to continue the talk by reiterating or summarizing the main points. 
Similar simulated public speaking tasks have been used successfully as laboratory 




We assessed two indicators of physiological responding: skin conductance 
response (SCR), and heart rate (HR). These variables have previously been used in 
studies of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997). SCR is a 
relatively pure measure of the activation of the sympathetic nervous system, whereas HR 
is influenced by both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous systems (al’Absi 
et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 2000).  
Continuous measurements were made of HR, SCR and respiration using a 
BIOPAC™ MP150 system connected to a computer running AcqKnowledge 4.1.1 
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software (BIOPAC, 2008). HR was recorded using two disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes 
positioned in a type II configuration and was sampled at 512Hz. SCR was measured 
using two grounded Ag/AgCl electrodes attached to the medial phalanx of the index and 
ring fingers of the non-dominant hand and was sampled at 125Hz. Analyses of the HR 
and SCR data were conducted using AcqKnowledge 4.1.1 (BIOPAC, 2008). SCR and 
HR were recorded throughout the experiment, and average values for each participant 
were computed for the baseline, preparation, speech, and recovery periods (see 
procedure). “SCR-recovery” and “HR-recovery” values were calculated by subtracting 
the average SCR/HR value in the recovery period from the average SCR/HR value in the 
speech period (see Figure 1). The SCR-recovery value thus indicates the extent to which 
SCR decreased between the speech period and the recovery period – higher values 
indicating a greater decrease – with HR-recovery values reflecting decreases in HR 
between those periods. Reactivity values for SCR and HR were also computed, by 
subtracting the average value in the baseline period from the average value in the speech 
period. The SCR-reactivity (or HR-reactivity) value therefore indicates the extent to 
which SCR (or HR) increased between the baseline period and the speech period – 
higher reactivity scores indicating a greater increase. 
 
Procedure 
On arrival, participants completed a set of questionnaires, including the BDI-II 
and the SSPS. SCR and HR electrodes were then attached, and participants were asked 
to sit and relax for 5 minutes while we collected baseline physiological measurements 
(the baseline period). Participants then completed their first POMS form (post-baseline 
POMS), and then completed the EF task. Next they received the instructions for the 
speech task, and were given a 3-minute period in which to prepare for the speech 
(preparation period). Before delivering the speech to a video camera, they filled out 
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another POMS form (post-preparation POMS). After delivering the speech, they were 
asked to sit and relax for another 5-minute period (recovery period), and then they 
completed a final POMS form (post-recovery POMS).  
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Data Analytic Plan 
 Dependent Variable Calculation. Our primary dependent variable was the 
magnitude of physiological recovery following a simulated public speaking task (speech 
task). We measured physiological recovery using two separate measures: skin 
conductance response (SCR) and heart rate (HR). SCR-recovery and HR-recovery 
values were calculated by computing the average SCR or HR value from the period in 
which the speech task is performed (speech period), and subtracting from it the average 
SCR or HR value from the recovery period at the end of the experiment. The SCR-
recovery (in microSiemens) and HR-recovery (in beats per minute) scores are therefore 
measures of the extent to which physiological arousal decreased between the speech 
period and the recovery period. We also measured reactivity to the speech task, by 
computing the average SCR or HR scores from the baseline period at the start of the 
experiment, and subtracting them from the average SCR or HR scores from the speech 
period (to produce SCR-reactivity, and HR-reactivity, respectively). Furthermore, we 
measured self-reported affective recovery (POMS-recovery) by subtracting the post-
recovery POMS score from the post-preparation POMS score. Similarly, self-reported 
affective reactivity (POMS-reactivity) was computed by subtracting the post-baseline 
POMS score from the post-preparation POMS score
1
.  
Statistical Analyses. The data analytic plan included four steps. First, before 
conducting the main data analyses, distributions of the dependent variables (SCR-
recovery, HR-recovery, POMS-recovery, SCR-reactivity, HR-reactivity and POMS-
reactivity) were examined for skewness and kurtosis, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
were conducted. All variables were normally distributed, except for HR-recovery, D(39) 
= .232, p < .001,  and HR-reactivity, D(39) = .144, p < .05. These two variables were 
                                                 
1
 We chose to locate the POMS between the preparation period and the speech period on the basis of prior 
data from our lab suggesting that maximal arousal in the speech task occurs during the preparation period, 
rather than the speech period.  
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therefore subjected to a natural log transformation, resulting in normally distributed data. 
Second, univariate repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether 
SCR, HR and POMS values were different at the different time-points. This was 
followed by planned comparison t-tests comparing the dependent variables at each time-
point, conducted as a manipulation check to assess whether the speech task was 
experienced as stressful by the participants. Third, to test the hypotheses that EF would 
predict physiological/affective recovery, and that this relationship might be moderated 
by social safeness (SSPS), we conducted three (hierarchical) multiple regression 
analyses, entering EF, SSPS and the EF×SSPS interaction as predictors of SCR-
recovery, HR-recovery and POMS-recovery. Similarly, to test the hypotheses that the 
relationship between EF and recovery might be moderated by depression symptoms 
(BDI), we conducted three multiple regression analyses, entering EF, BDI and the 
EF×BDI interaction as predictors of SCR-recovery, HR-recovery and POMS-recovery. 
T-tests of simple slopes were carried out to probe any significant interactions. Fourth, to 
test whether EF, SSPS or BDI would be related to physiological or affective reactivity, 
we repeated the regression analyses from the previous step, this time with SCR-
reactivity, HR-reactivity and POMS-reactivity as dependent variables. For all 
regressions conducted, data were examined for linearity in the relationship between the 
variables, and independence, homoscedasticity and normality of the errors, by checking 
plots of residuals versus predicted values, autocorrelation of residuals, residuals versus 
time, and normality probability, respectively. No evidence of violation of the 
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 Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables (N=39 for all) 
are listed below in Table 1, and zero-order Pearson correlations are listed in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean SD 
BDI-II Total 0.00 37.00 8.44 8.86
SSPS Total 14.00 44.00 31.67 8.67
Balanced EF -0.67 0.83 0.23 0.36
POMS Reactivity -9.00 35.00 10.33 10.48
SCR Reactivity -0.11 8.01 3.31 1.63
Log HR Reactivity (+15) 1.37 3.95 3.04 0.49
POMS Recovery -11.00 30.00 9.10 8.75
SCR Recovery -0.11 3.44 1.22 0.71
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Manipulation checks 
In order to check whether the speech task was experienced as stressful by 
participants, we conducted univariate repeated-measures ANOVAs to determine whether 
SCR, HR and POMS values were different at the different time-points. A significant 
quadratic trend was found for SCR, F(1,38) = 209.77, p < .001, as well as for HR, F(1, 
38) = 39.69, p < .001, and POMS, F(1,38) = 49.46, p < .001. We then conducted t-tests 
comparing values at different time-points, using a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons to arrive at a required significance level of .0083 for SCR and HR (six 
comparisons each) and .017 for POMS (three comparisons). Mean SCR and HR values 
were compared for the baseline, preparation, speech, and recovery periods (see Figure 1 
for mean values), while mean POMS values were compared post-baseline, post-
preparation, and post-recovery (see Figure 2 for mean values). Table 3 shows the results 
of these statistical comparisons. 
 
Table 3         
Comparisons between different time-periods for stress measures 
Variable Comparison t df p (2-tailed) 
POMS         
  Post-Baseline vs. Post-Speech -6.16 38 0.000 
  Post-Speech vs. Post-Recovery 6.494 38 0.000 
  Post-Baseline vs. Post-Recovery -0.888 38 0.380 
HR         
  Baseline vs. Preparation -3.411 38 0.002 
  Baseline vs. Speech -4.893 38 0.000 
  Baseline vs. Recovery -6.49 38 0.000 
  Preparation vs. Speech -2.886 38 0.006 
  Preparation vs. Recovery 6.308 38 0.000 
  Speech vs. Recovery 7.437 38 0.000 
SCR         
  Baseline vs. Preparation -13.086 38 0.000 
  Baseline vs. Speech -12.663 38 0.000 
  Baseline vs. Recovery -8.441 38 0.000 
  Preparation vs. Speech -3.649 38 0.001 
  Preparation vs. Recovery 4.064 38 0.000 
  46 
  Speech vs. Recovery 10.66 38 0.000 
 
 
 As can be seen in Table 3, SCR and HR values from each time-period were 
reliably different from those at every other time-period (p < .05, with Bonferroni 
correction, for all comparisons). POMS values, on the other hand, did not differ between 
the post-baseline and the post-recovery time-points (t < 1), but both these time-points 
did have reliably different POMS values to the post-preparation time-point (p < .05, with 
Bonferroni correction, for both comparisons). Thus, the pattern of the mean SCR and 
HR values, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively, was to increase from baseline to 
preparation, and then further increase during the speech period, and then finally to 
decrease again in the recovery period. This demonstrates that our speech-task 
manipulation did have the desired effect on participants, in that arousal levels increased 
during the task, and reduced again afterwards. The intention that this increase in arousal 
should have a negative affective quality to it – i.e. that it would reflect stress – is borne 
out by the pattern of the mean POMS scores, shown in Figure 3, which demonstrates an 
increase in negative affect at the post-preparation time-point (between preparation and 
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Figure 1. Time-course of SCR. SCR-Recovery scores reflect the difference between the 

























Figure 2. Time-course of HR. HR-Recovery scores reflect the difference between the 



























Figure 3. Time-course of POMS scores. POMS-Recovery scores reflect the difference 
between the two circled time-points (post-preparation and post-recovery). 
  48 
 
Do Social Safeness and Current Depression Symptoms Moderate The Relationship 
Between Return To Baseline Arousal And EF?   
Our main aim was to test the hypothesis that any relationship between EF and 
physiological recovery following a stressful task would be moderated by social threat 
(social safeness) and background adversity (current depression symptoms). Recall that 
recovery scores reflect the decrease in arousal (physiological arousal for SCR and HR, 
self-reported arousal for POMS) between the speech period and the recovery period. 
Regression models to test these relationships using centred variables are summarised in 
Tables 4-6.  
 
Table 4 
Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on SCR-Recovery   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
Step 1             0.02 –   
EF -0.10 0.33 -0.05 -0.30         
SSPS 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.82         
Step 2             0.21 0.19 * 
EF -0.11 0.30 -0.06 -0.37         
SSPS 0.02 0.01 0.21 1.39         
EF × SSPS -0.12 0.04 -0.44 -2.91 **       
  
Step 1             0.05 –   
EF -0.01 0.32 -0.01 -0.04         
BDI -0.02 0.01 -0.23 -1.39         
Step 2             0.06 0.01   
EF 0.04 0.34 0.02 0.10         
BDI -0.02 0.02 -0.28 -1.41         
EF × BDI 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.46         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 5 
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Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on HR-Recovery   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
Step 1             0.04 –   
EF 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.97         
SSPS 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.62         
Step 2             0.06 0.02   
EF 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.97         
SSPS 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.47         
EF × SSPS 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.47         
  
Step 1             0.09 –   
EF 0.19 0.15 0.20 1.26         
BDI -0.01 0.01 -0.25 -1.55         
Step 2             0.09 0.00   
EF 0.18 0.16 0.19 1.09         
BDI -0.01 0.01 -0.22 -1.12         
EF × BDI -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.33         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 6 
Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on POMS-Recovery   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
Step 1             0.09 –   
EF -0.61 3.86 -0.03 -0.16         
SSPS 0.31 0.16 0.31 1.92 †       
Step 2             0.09 0.00   
EF -0.60 3.91 -0.02 -0.15         
SSPS 0.31 0.17 0.31 1.86 †       
EF × SSPS 0.04 0.53 0.01 0.07         
  
Step 1             0.00 –   
EF 0.12 4.07 0.00 0.03         
BDI 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.09         
Step 2             0.00 0.00   
EF -0.18 4.32 -0.01 -0.04         
BDI 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20         
EF × BDI -0.14 0.61 -0.05 -0.23         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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As can be seen in Tables 4-6, we regressed SCR-Recovery, HR-Recovery and 
POMS-Recovery on EF and SSPS, and EF and BDI separately, in a hierarchical manner 
with the interactions as Step 2. We did not examine a model with EF, SSPS, BDI, and 
all the 2- and 3-way interactions included, as using so many predictors is not 
recommended with a sample size less than 50 (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), as is the 
case in the present study. Table 4 shows that the model regressing SCR-Recovery on EF, 
SSPS, and their interaction was significant, F(3,35) = 3.12, p < .05. As predicted, the EF 
× SSPS interaction was a significant predictor of SCR-Recovery, t(35) = -2.91, p < .01. 












































Figure 4. Expressive Flexibility (EF) interacts with Social Safeness (SSPS) in predicting 
SCR-Recovery. 
 
p = .020 
p = .054 
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T-tests of simple slopes showed that, among participants with low social 
safeness, those who had higher EF had a larger SCR-recovery (i.e. a greater decrease in 
SCR from the speech period to the recovery period) than those with lower EF, t(35) = -
2.447, p < .05. In contrast, among participants with high social safeness, those who had 
higher EF had a smaller SCR-recovery (i.e. a smaller decrease in SCR from the speech 
period to the recovery period) than those with lower EF, t(35) = 1.996, p = .054, 
although this effect was only marginally reliable. 
 
Reactivity to the Speech Task   
While our main aim was to test the relationship between EF and physiological 
recovery, we also examined the relationship between reactivity to the speech task and 
our predictors: EF, SSPS and BDI. Recall that reactivity scores reflect the increase in 
arousal between the baseline period and the speech period. Regression models to test 
these relationships using centred variables are summarised in Tables 7-9.  
 
Table 7 
Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on SCR-Reactivity   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
SCR Reactivity 
Step 1             0.01 –   
EF 0.01 0.75 0.00 0.01         
SSPS 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.67         
Step 2             0.02 0.01   
EF 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00         
SSPS 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.75         
EF × SSPS -0.06 0.10 -0.10 -0.56         
  
Step 1             0.00 –   
EF 0.08 0.76 0.02 0.11         
BDI -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.20         
Step 2             0.06 0.06   
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EF -0.27 0.78 -0.06 -0.34         
BDI 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.62         
EF × BDI -0.16 0.11 -0.29 -1.49         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 8 
Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on HR-Reactivity   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
Step 1             0.00 –   
EF 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.01         
SSPS 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.35         
Step 2             0.09 0.08   
EF 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.03         
SSPS 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05         
EF × SSPS 0.05 0.03 0.29 1.80         
  
Step 1             0.09 –   
EF 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.29         
BDI -0.02 0.01 -0.30 -1.87 †       
Step 2             0.11 0.02   
EF 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00         
BDI -0.01 0.01 -0.21 -1.08         
EF × BDI -0.03 0.03 -0.18 -0.93         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 9 
Moderation Analysis of Expressive Flexibility (EF), Social Safeness (SSPS), and 
Current Depression Symptoms (BDI) on POMS-Reactivity   
Model Variable B SE B β    t   R2 ∆R2   
Step 1             0.17 – * 
EF -2.12 4.41 -0.07 -0.48         
SSPS 0.50 0.18 0.42 2.74 **       
Step 2             0.19 0.02   
EF -2.18 4.42 -0.08 -0.49         
SSPS 0.53 0.19 0.44 2.86 **       
EF × SSPS -0.56 0.60 -0.14 -0.93         
  
Step 1             0.02 –   
EF -0.37 4.82 -0.01 -0.08         
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BDI -0.15 0.20 -0.13 -0.78         
Step 2             0.02 0.00   
EF -0.26 5.13 -0.01 -0.05         
BDI -0.16 0.24 -0.14 -0.69         
EF × BDI 0.05 0.72 0.01 0.07         
† p < .075 (two-tailed). *p < .05 (two-tailed). **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
As can be seen in Tables 7-9, we regressed SCR-reactivity, HR-reactivity and 
POMS-reactivity on EF and SSPS, and EF and BDI separately, in a hierarchical manner 
with the interactions as Step 2. The model regressing POMS-reactivity on EF and SSPS 
was significant, F(3,35) = 3.78, p < .05, although the inclusion at Step 2 of the EF × 
SSPS interaction did not produce a significant improvement in the fit of the model, ∆R
2
 
= .019, p = .357. Within the model at Step 1, SSPS was a significant predictor of POMS-
reactivity, t(35) = 2.74, p < .01. As can be seen in Figure 5, people with higher social 
safeness scores tended to have higher POMS-reactivity (i.e. a greater increase in self-
reported negative affect between the post-baseline time-point and the post-preparation 
time-point).  
 




























Figure 5. Scatter plot with trend-line indicating that Social Safeness (SSPS) predicts 
POMS Reactivity. 
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Discussion 
 This study provides evidence that, as predicted, the interaction of EF and social 
safeness is related to immediate-term physiological recovery from a stressor. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the relationship between EF and 
physiological stress responding, and was designed to investigate possible mechanisms 
underlying a previously-evidenced relationship between EF and adjustment to life 
stresses (Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et al., 2010). EF interacted with social safeness 
such that for participants low in social safeness, higher EF was associated with greater 
SCR-recovery from the speech task (compared to lower EF), while for participants high 
in social safeness, higher EF was associated with smaller SCR-recovery from the speech 
task (compared to lower EF). As predicted, EF and the other variables were not found to 
influence physiological reactivity to, as opposed to recovery from, the speech task. 
However, self-reported affective reactivity to the speech task was found to be greater for 
people with higher social safeness. Across all analyses, BDI was not found to have an 
influence on stress responding, either alone or in interaction with EF. Also, no 
relationship between EF and the other variables was found in the HR data.  
 
Implications for the literature on EF 
 These findings support the suggestion that one mechanism underlying the 
relationship between EF and adjustment to life stressors is that people with higher EF, in 
the context of social threat, are better able to recover physiologically from a stressor in 
the immediate term. In our study, EF and social safeness interacted such that only for 
people with low social safeness did higher EF predict greater SCR-recovery. For people 
with low social safeness, the opposite was true, in that higher EF predicted lower SCR-
recovery. This is in line with Westphal et al. (2010)’s finding that the relationship 
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between EF and friend-rated adjustment to life stressors was stronger in the context of 
social threat (the presence of a subliminal threat prime). Thus, these findings converge 
on the idea that the adaptive or protective value of EF is most apparent in the context of 
social threat, although interestingly our data also suggest that in the absence of social 
threat, higher EF is associated with worse outcomes (lower SCR-recovery). This aspect 
of our findings is consistent with Westphal et al. (2010)’s finding that EF is in some 
contexts associated with worse outcomes: in their case, lower friend-rated adjustment 
was found associated with higher EF, only for people with lower levels of life stress. 
Westphal et al. (2010) predicted an interaction between EF and social threat on 
the basis of functional accounts of emotion (e.g. Ekman, 1993), which suggest that 
emotions evolved to deal with “problems associated with environmental threats and 
demands” (Westphal et al., 2010, p. 93), and that these functions of emotions are 
context-bound. In other words, if a primary function of emotional communication is to 
communicate about threat, then EF should be particularly important in the context of 
threat. Westphal et al. (2010) also suggested that social threat in particular might be 
relevant to EF, given that emotional communication via facial expression is inherently 
social. To state this differently, if a primary function of emotional communication is to 
regulate social threat, then EF, a form of regulation of emotional communication, should 
be particularly important in the context of social threat. Our findings certainly support 
this notion, and imply that the social consequences or correlates of low EF, in a similar 
vein to studies of the social consequences of emotional suppression (e.g. Butler et al., 
2003) may be a fruitful avenue for future research to pursue. For example, might people 
with high EF be perceived as less threatening to conversational partners? Our study 
demonstrates that, in a threat context, high-EF individuals are able not only to control 
emotional expression more fluidly, but also to recover physiologically from aversive 
emotions more rapidly. The notion that the ability not only to display the emotions being 
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experienced, but also to recover from them quickly, might be beneficial to social 
interaction, is in line with theoretical accounts of social interaction (and psychotherapy) 
that emphasize the importance of both communicating “ruptures” in social relationships 
and of timely “repair” of those ruptures (e.g. King-Casas et al., 2008; Safran, Muran, & 
Eubanks-Carter, 2011).  
The use of social safeness as a measure of social threat in the present study, as 
opposed to the use of a subliminal threat prime by Westphal et al. (2010), has some 
interesting implications. Social safeness is conceptualised as a more trait-like tendency 
to perceive social threat (Kelly et al., 2012) than a transient threat state, as would be 
expected to be induced by a threat prime word. As such, if low social safeness can be 
viewed as a maladaptive trait, and EF as an adaptive trait (Westphal et al., 2010) our 
data fit well with Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema (2012)’s evidence that adaptive traits 
become particularly important in the presence of maladaptive traits. In the case of our 
data, the suggestion would be that if an individual is prone to perceiving social threats, it 
will be that much more important to be able to regulate both their own physiological 
responses to those perceived threats, and their facial communication with the person 
who is the source of the perceived threat.  
Our findings suggest that people with high EF, by virtue of demonstrating 
stronger physiological recovery from a stressor in a threat context, are less prone to 
being “stuck” in a negative emotional state. Together with previous findings that EF is 
related to resilience to life stresses (Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et al. 2010), and that 
physiological recovery is related to resilience (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004), our 
evidence that EF is related to physiological recovery completes the “triangle” relating 
EF, physiological recovery, and resilience. As such, it provides a strong suggestion that 
the mechanism by which EF is related to long-term resilience may include better 
immediate-term physiological recovery. However, it is important to note that although 
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our data allow strong inferences about the mechanisms underlying the EF-adjustment 
relationship, we must restrict the strength of any conclusions about whether the EF-
adjustment relationship is due to physiological recovery, as we did not measure long-
term adjustment in this study. Future research could include measures of both 
immediate-term stress recovery and long-term adjustment to life stresses, and thus test 
whether recovery mediates the EF-adjustment relationship. Failing that, including a self-
reported measure of trait resiliency, as used in numerous relevant studies (Tugade & 
Fredrickson, 2004; Waugh et al., 2008; Waugh et al., 2011), would help provide a 
further test of these ideas. 
As our SCR-recovery and our SCR-reactivity measures both involve peak SCR 
in their calculation, one might speculate as to whether the relationships found with EF 
and SSPS in the recovery data are due to the magnitude of peak SCR. In other words, if 
a given low-SSPS, high-EF individual has demonstrated a large recovery, might that 
simply be due to them having a higher peak SCR in the first place, i.e. having more to 
recover from, rather than being due to SSPS and EF? The reactivity data speak against 
this possibility, as no relationships were found between physiological reactivity and EF, 
SSPS or BDI. Therefore, we can be more confident in inferring that the relationships we 
have discovered between EF, SSPS and SCR-recovery are actually due to regulation 
processes (i.e. the processes by which physiological recovery is achieved), rather than an 
artefact of our measurement process.  
The only pattern that did emerge from the reactivity data was that self-reported 
affective reactivity (measured via POMS) to the speech task was greater for people with 
higher social safeness. This finding could prompt the question as to whether higher 
emotional reactivity for people with high social safeness might explain or undermine our 
findings of a relationship between physiological recovery, social safeness, and EF. If 
high-SSPS individuals had higher reactivity, might this explain why some of them had 
  59 
greater recovery from that reaction, in that they had more to recover from? The data 
speak against this possibility, as reactivity and recovery had different relationships with 
social safeness: social safeness was only predictive of physiological recovery via its 
interaction with EF; the main effect of social safeness on recovery was not reliable. 
The question remains as to how we interpret the relationship between POMS-
reactivity and social safeness. The literature on social safeness as a construct, especially 
as measured by the SSPS, is still in its infancy. This notwithstanding, the notion that 
people with higher social safeness might respond more negatively to a task intended to 
be a social stressor seems to run contrary to the concept of social safeness itself. In that 
regard, this finding might indicate a note of caution in our main conclusions: perhaps 
what is being measured by the SSPS, or indeed by reactivity to the speech task, is not 
quite what we had hoped. However, there are alternative explanations that to our minds 
have substantial merit. The fact that there was no relationship between SSPS and 
physiological reactivity shows a disparity between self-reported and physiological 
reactivity. This suggests that the difference in POMS scores between high and low-SSPS 
individuals may reflect a difference in how affective experience is reported, rather than a 
difference in the affective experience itself. It is possible that people with higher social 
safeness are less likely to demonstrate repressive coping, i.e. to under-report negative 
emotion (e.g. Derakshan et al., 2007). It should also be noted that the POMS data should 
be interpreted with a degree of caution, simply due to the fact that we did not sample 
POMS at a time-point directly after delivery of the speech. We located the POMS only 
at post-baseline, post-preparation, and post-recovery, on the basis that previous data 
from our lab had suggested that peak arousal in the speech task would come during 
preparation – something that proved not to be the case in these data. As such, our POMS 
data cannot give us a truly satisfactory account of self-reported affect, either in terms of 
reactivity or recovery. 
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Limitations 
The disparity between our SCR findings and our HR findings slightly weakens our 
conclusions, in that they would have been stronger had HR shown the same pattern as 
SCR. However, the lack of reliable relationship between EF and our other variables on 
HR does not contradict our other findings, given that HR is known to be influenced by 
both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous systems, while SCR is seen as a 
relatively pure index of sympathetic nervous system activation (al’Absi et al., 1997; 
Cohen et al., 2000). 
Although we found differing influences of SSPS and BDI in this study, for statistical 
reasons we didn’t examine the 3-way interaction, and as such we shouldn’t over-state 
the independence of their relationships with EF and our dependent variables. 
 
Clinical implications 
Emotion regulation – the manner in which we attempt, knowingly or otherwise, to 
adjust to or change our experience of emotions – is a fundamental focus of almost all 
models of psychopathology or psychotherapy. Whether a theoretical perspective talks 
about “defenses” against “core pain” (e.g. Lemma, 2003), “procedures” that start with a 
“feeling” (e.g. Ryle, 1990), “the manipulation of emotional states” (Hayes, Luoma, 
Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006), or whether they explicitly use the term “emotion 
regulation” (e.g. Linehan, 1993), which has become the standard term in the empirical 
literature (e.g. Gross, 1998), the manner in which we deal with emotions is a key focus 
of both formulation and intervention in psychotherapy. The present research adds to a 
growing literature suggesting that flexibility and context-specificity of emotion 
regulation strategies may be important for wellbeing (e.g. Bonanno et al., 2004; Coifman 
& Bonanno, 2010; Rottenberg, Gross & Gottlib, 2005; Waugh et al., 2011; Westphal et 
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al., 2010). This suggestion may inform future developments of theoretical and 
therapeutic approaches, but in the immediate term there are also ways in which it could 
be used clinically, especially for people with low social safeness, who, on some models 
(e.g. Gilbert, Allan & Goss, 1996), are likely to be many if not most of the people seen 
by mental health services. For example, the present findings could inform a 
psychoeducational approach to assessment and formulation: a clinician might say to a 
client who appears to be sensitive to social threat, “given what you’ve told me, it’s 
possible that you often find yourself ‘stuck’ in emotions – does that seem to fit your 
experience?”. A reduced ability to recover physiologically from emotional arousal might 
lead someone to unwittingly interpret subsequent events as more aversive or threatening. 
Another clinical possibility, therefore, along the lines of behavioural “chain analysis” 
used in DBT (Linehan, 1993), would be to help a client recognize whether their 
emotional reaction to an event might actually be influenced by the aversive event that 
occurred just prior. A third possibility is that a psychological intervention might 
explicitly train flexibility in physiological responding, or flexibility in control of facial 
expressivity. A similar approach is in fact currently being implemented in a new 
development of DBT, which targets habitual suppressors of emotion, and includes 
training in the practice of “radical openness”, which entails behavioural, cognitive, and 
emotional flexibility (Lynch & Cheavens, 2008). Furthermore, the development of 
“psychological flexibility”, which includes letting go of resistance to emotional 
experiences, is the main aim of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT – Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 2003). Finally, an alternative clinical application of the present 
findings would be in targeting an individual’s lack of social safeness. Such an aim is 
central to Compassion-Focused Therapy (CFT – Gilbert, 2010), in which the client is 
trained in accessing compassionate responses to internal emotional events. In so doing, 
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the client aims to counter the postulated “internal critic” that drives the threat-sensitivity, 
and, our results would suggest, poor physiological recovery from stressful experiences. 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings provide further evidence for the importance of context in emotion 
regulation. They extend the small but growing literature on EF to the domain of 
physiological stress responding, and demonstrate that EF, in the appropriate context, is 
related to this immediate-term type of resilience, as well as the longer-term types of 
resilience investigated by previous studies (Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et al., 2010; 
Gupta & Bonanno, 2011). Future research could more directly investigate a link between 
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Section 4: Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Expanded Method 
This section includes further information to supplement the method section of 
the manuscript.  Specifically, by reproducing the task instructions.   
 
Task Instructions 
A script that was used as a rough template for spoken instructions to participants 
in the EF task is appended below.  
"There are a few more things I need to tell you about the experiment.  
 
First, there is another person in the adjacent room who will also take part in this 
experiment. You will not see this person. However, sometimes the other person will 
be able to see you on a monitor. Right now the monitor is turned off, but at different 
times in the study, the monitor will be turned on by the computer. You will always 
know when the monitor is on and when the monitor is off. As I said, right now it is off. 
 
The person in the other room is part of the study. This person has a different task 
than you. Your task is to view emotional images and rate your emotional reactions, as 
you have just done. The person in the other room will not see any images, but rather 
will view you on the monitor and try to guess what emotions you are feeling.  
 
There is one more part to the study. Sometimes the computer will ask you to do your 
best to express your emotions as fully as possible to help the other person guess what 
you are feeling. Other times, the computer will ask you to do your best to suppress 
any outward expression of emotion, so that it is very difficult for the other person to 
guess what you are feelings. There will also be some trials when the computer will 
tell you that the monitor is turned off. In this case, the computer will still present you 
with a set of emotional images and will still ask you to indicate what you are feeling. 
And we will still ask the person in the other room to try to guess what you are feeling. 
Naturally, since the person in the other room can't see you, they will not be able to 
tell what you are actually feeling. We do this so we can measure and account for 
what the person is assuming that you’re feeling. 
 
I am going to repeat this more clearly: 
• You will continue to view sets of either positive or negative images and to rate 
your emotional reactions to these images on the computer. 
• Sometimes the computer will tell you that the monitor is on and that you are to 
do your best to express your emotional reactions to the images. 
• Sometimes the computer will tell you that the monitor is on and that you are to 
do your best to suppress any outward expression of emotion in response to the 
images. 
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• Sometimes the computer will tell you that the monitor is turned off. In this case, 
you simply view them carefully and then rate your emotional reactions. 
 
When you are asked to express your emotional reactions to the images, you should 
try to do this primarily with facial expressions. The person in the other room will only 
see your head and neck and will not hear any sound from this room. 
Is that clear? Do you have any questions?”  
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Appendix 3 – Participant Information Sheet 
INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
 
The psychophysiological correlates of expressive flexibility 
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The ability to regulate one’s emotions is a very important component of effective social 
functioning and maintaining interpersonal relationships. Unfortunately, not everyone in 
our society is able to regulate his or her emotions appropriately. The aim of this study is 
to investigate the psychophysiological correlates of suppressing, enhancing or 
maintaining facial expressions to emotional stimuli. 
 
PROCEDURES  
Participation in the study will involve attending for a single testing session, which will 
last about 120 minutes. During this session you will be asked to complete some 
questionnaires and carry out some short experimental tasks. The questionnaires will ask 
about your current mood as well as how you tend to think and behave. Whilst carrying 
out the tasks we will measure psychophysiological responses: heart rate, respiration and 
sweat activity. To measure these responses it is necessary to attach some sensors to your 
skin on your torso (heart rate) and fingers (sweat activity). These sensors are like 
plasters; they are perfectly safe, easy to attach and remove, and you will not feel 
anything during the measurements. Respiration is measured by an elastic waistband 
which can be worn over your normal clothes. 
 
USE OF VIDEO RECORDINGS 
In addition to the psychophysiological measures we also want to film your facial 
expressions to some of the stimuli. A webcam will be positioned near the computer to 
record your facial expressions during some of the tasks. After the experiment the videos 
will be rated to assess the level of expression shown.  
 
In future research we would like to use some of the videos recorded in this study in other 
experiments. Please indicate on the consent form whether you are happy for us to use the 
films recorded today in future studies. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The information you give which is recorded will be kept strictly confidential, except as 
may be required by the law or professional guidelines for psychologists. All information 
will be identified by an identification code, not your name. Any form that requires your 
name (e.g., this consent form) will be stored separately from the other material. Your 
name or other identifying information will never be associated with any research reports 
or publications that use the results of your questionnaires or interviews. Confidentiality 
may be broken only in exceptional circumstances, for example when the experimenter 
believes that there is a significant risk of harm to you or someone else.  
 
WITHDRAWAL/PREMATURE COMPLETION 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may discontinue at any 
time, without prejudice. Although you will be asked to complete questionnaires without 
omitting items, if you do not wish to answer a question you may omit it. 
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REMUNERATION 
You will receive either course credits or a small payment in recognition of your 
participation in this study. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
Some of the questions in the questionnaires ask about somewhat personal topics such as 
certain difficult or upsetting thoughts and feelings that you might have experienced, and 
how you feel at the time of the experiment. Please remember that you may stop the study 




No direct benefits from this study to participants are intended, other than the receipt of 
course credits or a small payment. 
 
INVITATION TO ASK FURTHER QUESTIONS 
Should you have any questions about the study you can ask these at any time.  
 
Megan Barnsley can be contacted on 01392 724668 or via email: mcb204@exeter.ac.uk 
Guy Mizon can also be contacted via email: gam209@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Please feel free to ask any questions and discuss the study prior to completing the 
consent form.  
 
 
   








Please tick and sign below 
 
 After reading the Study Information Sheet for the above study I agree to take 
part. I have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason.  
 
 I agree to my session being audio / video-taped for research purposes.  
 
 I agree to my video-tapes being stored and used for future research purposes.  
Note: if you do not agree to your video-tapes being stored for future research purposes 
your video material will be destroyed at the end of this project 
 
 I agree to my contact details being added to the Mood Disorder Centres database 
so that I might be invited to take part in more research in the future. 
 
 
I have read and understand the consent form.  
 
 
Participant signature: ____________________________________ Date: ___________ 
Participant name (printed): ____________________________________ 
 
 
Investigator: ___________________________________________ Date: ___________ 
 
 
Questions or concerns about the study can be addressed to the Chair of the Ethics 
Committee, School of Psychology, University of Exeter. 
   




The psychophysiological correlates of expressive flexibility 
 
The purpose of this sheet is to inform you of the aims of the study that you have 
participated in, and to give you information about potential sources of support should 
you think these would be helpful. 
 
This study aimed to investigate how suppressing, enhancing and maintaining facial 
expressions to emotional stimuli is related to functioning of the autonomic nervous 
system. People with the ability to successfully suppress or exaggerate their facial 
expressions when instructed have been shown to be better adjusted over time. This has 
led researchers to believe that expressive flexibility is a trait measure (i.e., stable over 
time). The current research wanted to investigate 1) whether expressive flexibility can be 
affected in the short term by the arousal generated in defensive physiological states (e.g. 
feelings of anxiety and stress), and 2) whether expressive flexibility is related to the 
strength of physiological response to a stressful task. 
 
This was a between subjects design, which means that different participants receive 
different tasks and instructions. All participants carry out the suppress, enhance and 
maintain instructions for six blocks of stimuli, as well as the emotion recognition task. 
Half of the participants are then randomised to a stressful condition (preparing a speech) 
and the other half are randomised to a non-stressful condition (reading). After the same 
amount of time has elapsed for both groups all participants complete the suppress, 
enhance and maintain instructions for another six blocks of stimuli. This design allows 
us to investigate the effects of arousal on the expressive flexibility task, as well as the 
relationship between expressive flexibility and the magnitude of stress responses. We 
are also interested in the relationship between expressive flexibility and the ability to 
discriminate between different facial emotions, as you did in the “multimorph” task. 
 
It is important to point out that there was a small degree of deception in this study: you 
were instructed to suppress and enhance your facial expressions so that another 
participant in another room would (or would not) be able to guess them. In fact, there 
wasn’t another participant in another room watching you – although, as you know, your 
expressions were being recorded on video. We included this instruction because we felt 
it was important that our participants felt they were using their facial expressions to 
communicate to another person. Likewise, the speech you gave to camera will not be 
rated by experts. We included this instruction in order to increase the stressful nature of 
the task, as most people find public speaking rather stressful. We hope you are not upset 
by this deception. If you are, or have any questions, please talk to the experimenter. 
Also, please do not discuss this aspect of the experiment with your friends, in case they 
come to do the experiment themselves. 
 
Whilst this study was not designed to induce severe distress, should you experience 
distress or upset at any point in connection with the study, or with issues highlighted by 
it, there are a number of sources of support and advice that you may access (listed 
below). In addition to this, you can contact the experimenters (Megan Barnsley and Guy 
Mizon) to discuss any aspect of the study or your response to it. Megan can be contacted 
   
on 01392 724668 or via email: mcb204@ex.ac.uk, and Guy can be contacted via 
gam209@ex.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you for your participation in the study. 
 
Contacting health professionals:  
A number of health professionals are able to offer help and advice to people troubled by extreme 
mood states or distressing thoughts and feelings. These include: 
 
• Your GP. You can contact your GP to arrange an appointment, or in an emergency: 
most GP surgeries will connect you to an out-of-hours service if you call outside of 
office hours needing help. As a student you can contact Exeter University Student 
Health Centre, whether or not you are currently registered there: 
 
Streatham Campus 
Student Health Centre, Reed Mews 
(01392) 676606 or x 4414 
At other times during vacation contact the St Thomas Health Centre  
(01392) 676678 
 
St Luke’s Campus  
Heavitree Health Practice, Heavitree Health Centre 
08444 773486 
 
• Student Counselling Service. The Student Counselling Service is open from 9.30 – 
1.00pm and 2.00 - 5.00pm during term. You can call to arrange an appointment. Their 
contact details are: 
 
Student Counselling Service 
Reed Hall, Hailey Wing 
Streatham Drive 
Exeter EX4 4PD 
Tel: (01392) 724381 
 
For further information see their webpages at: 
http://as.exeter.ac.uk/support/counselling/ 
 
Other sources of support / information: 
 
• Voice (University of Exeter Nightline). Voice is a student listening and information 
service run by students for students at Exeter University. If you are experiencing 
personal difficulties or are feeling sad, stressed, lost or worried and would like to talk to 
someone you can contact them on: 
 




• Samaritans: Samaritans provides confidential emotional support 24 hours a day. You 
can telephone them at any time or visit them in person between the hours given below. 
 
24-hour helpline: 08457 909090 
Email help service: jo@samaritans.org 
Address: 10 Richmond Road, Exeter, EX4 4JA (10.30 – 21.30 Mon-Sat / 4.30-9.30 Sun) 
Website: http://www.samaritans.org 
   
Appendix 6 – Questionnaires 
BDI-II 
 
Please read each group of statements carefully, then pick out the one statement in each 
group which best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, 
including today.  Circle the number beside the statement you have picked.   
 
If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, simply circle the statement 
which has the largest number.  Be sure that you do not circle more than one statement 
for Item 16 (change in sleeping pattern) and Item 18 (change in appetite.) 
 
1 Sadness 
 0 I do not feel sad. 
 1 I feel sad much of the time. 
 2 I am sad all the time. 
 3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
 
 2 Pessimism 
 0 I am not discouraged about my future. 
 1 I feel  more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
 2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 
 3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
 
 3 Past Failure 
 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
 1 I have failed more than I should have. 
 2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
 3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
 
 4 Loss of Pleasure 
 0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
 1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to. 
 2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 3 I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 
5 Guilty Feelings 
 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
 1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
 2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
 3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
 6 Punishment Feelings 
 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
 1 I feel I may be punished. 
 2 I expect to be punished. 
 3 I feel I am being punished. 
 
 7 Self Dislike 
 0 I feel the same about myself as ever. 
 1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
 2 I am disappointed in myself. 
 3 I dislike myself. 
 
 8 Self Criticalness 
 0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
   
 1 I am  more critical of myself than I used to be. 
 2 I criticize myself for all of my faults. 
 3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
 9 Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
 2 I would like to kill myself. 
 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
10 Crying 
 0 I don't cry any more than I used to. 
 1 I cry more than I used to. 
 2 I cry over every little thing. 
 3 I feel like crying but I can’t. 
 
11 Agitation 
 0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
 1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
 2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
 3 I am so restless or agitated I have to keep moving or doing something. 
 
12 Loss of Interest 
 0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
 1 I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
 2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
 3 It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
 
13 Indecisiveness      
 0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
 1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
 2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
 3 I have trouble making any decisions. 
 
14 Worthlessness 
 0 I do not feel I am worthless. 
 1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile or useful as I used to. 
 2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
 3 I feel utterly worthless. 
 
15 Loss of Energy 
 0 I have as much energy as ever. 
 1 I have less energy than I used to have. 
 2 I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
 3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
 
16 Change in Sleeping Pattern 
 0 I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1a I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
 1b I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 
 2b I sleep a lot less than usual. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 3a I sleep most of the day. 
 3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep. 
 
17 Irritability 
 0 I am no more irritable than usual. 
 1 I am more irritable than usual. 
   
 2 I am much more irritable than usual. 
 3 I am irritable all the time. 
 
18 Change in Appetite 
 0 I have not experienced any change in my appetite. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
 1b My appetite is somewhat greater that usual. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2a My appetite is much less than before. 
 2b My appetite is much greater than usual. 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 3a I have no appetite at all. 
 3b I crave food all the time. 
 
19 Concentration Difficulty 
 0 I can concentrate as well as ever. 
 1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
 2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
 3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
 
20 Tiredness or Fatigue 
 0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
 1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
 2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of things I used to do. 
 3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
 
21 Loss of Interest in Sex 
 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
 2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
 3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
   
SSPS 
 
We are interested in how people experience pleasure, positive feelings and emotions in 
social situations. Below are a series of statements about how you may feel in various 
situations. Please read each statement carefully and circle the number that best describes 






   
Almost all 
the time 
1. I feel content within my relationships 0 1 2 3 4 
2. 
I feel easily soothed by those around 
me 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel connected to others 0 1 2 3 4 
4. 
I feel part of something greater than 
myself 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. 
I have a sense of being cared about in 
the world 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel secure and wanted 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I feel a sense of belonging 0 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel accepted by people 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I feel understood by people 0 1 2 3 4 
10. 
I feel a sense of warmth in my 
relationships with people 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. 
I find it easy to feel calmed by 
people close to me 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
   
POMS-SF 
 
Please rate the following statements according to how you feel right now by circling the 
corresponding number. 
 
  Not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Tense 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Worn out 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Unhappy 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Lively 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Confused 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Peeved 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Active 0 1 2 3 4 
10. On edge 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Grouchy 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Blue 0 1 2 3 4 
13. Energetic 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Hopeless 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Uneasy 0 1 2 3 4 




0 1 2 3 4 
18. Fatigued 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Discouraged 0 1 2 3 4 
21. Resentful 0 1 2 3 4 
22. Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 
23. Miserable 0 1 2 3 4 
24. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 
25. Bitter 0 1 2 3 4 
26. Exhausted 0 1 2 3 4 
27. Anxious 0 1 2 3 4 
28. Helpless 0 1 2 3 4 
29. Weary 0 1 2 3 4 
30. Bewildered 0 1 2 3 4 
31. Furious 0 1 2 3 4 
32. Full of pep 0 1 2 3 4 
33. Worthless 0 1 2 3 4 
34. Forgetful 0 1 2 3 4 
35. Vigorous 0 1 2 3 4 
   
36. Uncertain 0 1 2 3 4 
37. Bushed 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
   
Section 5: Dissemination Statement 
 
In order to benefit a wide audience of service users, mental health professionals, 
academics and the general public, the intended dissemination of the research includes: 
 
• Submission for publication to the APA journal “Emotion”, which has been 
selected as a high-impact journal, publishing a range of research in this area. This 
journal has a target audience of emotion researchers, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and other mental health professionals.   
• Submission to further journals will be made, as necessary. 
• Presentation at a BABCP conference. 
• A summary of the findings will be offered to any participants who request to be 
informed.  This summary will contain a reference to any publications resulting 
from the study. 
• A presentation to trainee clinical psychologists. 
 
